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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

)

)

CaseNo.20020063-SC
(Subject to assignment to the
Court of Appeals)

)

Argument Priority (15)

)

vs.
G. KAY INC.,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
G.KAY, INC.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(j),
and Order of the Supreme Court granting permission to appeal on interlocutory order dated
March 6,2002.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Whether Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") has made to appear that the
use to which the property of G. Kay, Inc. is to be applied is a use authorized by law; that the
taking is necessary to such use; and that construction and use of all the property sought to be
condemned will be commenced within a reasonable time, all as required as conditions precedent
to the taking, under Utah Code Annotated §78-34-4(l)(2)(3). These issues were raised in
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and in the Memorandum in Support of said motion.
The standard of review relating to all issues presented for review herein are as stated in
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St. Benedict's Dev. v. St Benedicf s Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) at page 196 which this
Court stated the standard as follows:
A rule 12(bX6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but
challenges the plaintifFs right to the relief based on those facts. 61A AmJur.2d Pleading
§227 (1981). When determining whether a trial court properly granted a rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider
them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Because the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, we give the
trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard.
(Citations omitted).
2. Whether G. Kay., Inc.'s 32 acres which are situated some 1400 feetfromthe freeway
known as Project No. 0067 and Legacy Parkway (Rl 1), can be taken by eminent domain for what
UDOT calls the "Legacy Nature Preserve" (R13).
This issue was raised in the Motion to Dismiss, and throughout hearings on the Motion
For Immediate Occupancy.
3. Whether paragraph 4 of the Order of Immediate Occupancy that "The funds as
deposited do not incur interest, and in the event Defendant does not withdraw said funds, the
Defendant shall waive interest or otherwise obtain an Order of the Court providing for payment
of the funds into an interest bearing account" (R257) is constitutional or otherwise proper. This
issue was raised and preserved for appeal by written objectionfiledby G. Kay., Inc. (R268), and
by letter (R274).
This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness.
4. Whether UDOTs power of eminent domain extends to private water rights (R6-7).
The remaining issues briefed herein are related to and within the scope of the foregoing
issues.
2

DETERMINATIVE LAWS
Article I §22 Constitution of Utah provides that "private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation/'
Utah Code Annotated §78-34-1, lists uses for which therightof eminent domain may be
exercised, which in pertinent part provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this chapter, therightof eminent domain may be exercised
in behalf of the following public uses:
(1) All public uses authorized by the Government of the United States,
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other public uses
authorized by the Legislature."
Utah Code Annotated §72-5-102. Definitions.
As used in this part, "state transportation purposes" includes:
(1) highway and public transportationrights-of-way,including those necessary
within cities and towns;
(2) the construction, reconstruction, relocation, improvement, maintenance, and
mitigationfromthe effects of these activities on state highways and other transportation
facilities under the control of the department;
(3) limited access facilities, includingrightsof access, air, light, and view and
frontage and service roads to highways;
(4) adequate drainage in connection with any highway, cut, fill, or channel change
and the maintenance of any highway, cut, fill, or channel change;
(5) weighing stations, shops, offices, storage buildings and yards, and road
maintenance or construction sites;
(6) road material sites, sites for the manufacture of road materials, and access
roads to the sites;
(7) the maintenance of an unobstructed view of any portion of a highway to
promote the safety of the traveling public;
(8) the placement of traffic signals, directional signs, and other signs, fences,
curbs barriers, and obstructions for the convenience of the traveling public;
(9) the construction and maintenance of storm sewers, sidewalks, and highway
illumination;
(10) the construction and maintenance of livestock highways;
(11) the construction and maintenance of roadside rest areas adjacent to or near
any highway, and
(12) the mitigation of impactsfrompublic transportation projects.
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(Mitigation was added to subsections (2) and (12) by Senate Bill 256 in 2001)
Utah Code Annotated §78-34-4. Conditions precedent to taking.
Before property can be taken it must appear:
(1) that the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law;
(2) that the taking is necessary to such use;
(3) that construction and use of all property sought to be condemned will
commence within a reasonable time as determined by the court, after the initiation of
proceedings under this chapter; and
(4) if already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which it is to
be applied is a more necessary public use.
Utah Code Annotated §72-5-103. Acquisition ofrights-of-wayand other real property —
Title to property acquired.
(1) The department may acquire any real property or interests in real property
necessary for temporary, present, or reasonable future state transportation purposes by
gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise.
(2)(a)(i) Title to real property acquired by the department or the counties, cities,
and towns by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise for
highwayrights-of-wayor other transportation purposes may be in fee simple or any lesser
estate or interest.
(ii) Title to real property acquired by the department for a public transit
project shall be transferred to the public transit district responsible for the project.
(iii) A public transit district shall cover all costs associated with any
condemnation on its behalf.
Utah Code Annotated §78-34-2. Estates andrightsthat may be taken.
The following estates andrightsin lands are subject to being taken for public use:
(1) a fee simple, when taken for:
(a) public buildings or grounds;
(b) permanent buildings;
(c) reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned by them;
(d) any permanentfloodcontrol structure affixed to the land;
(e) an outlet for aflow,a place for the deposit of debris or tailings of a mine,
mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores; and
(f) solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in
solution, except when the surface ground is underlaid with minerals, coal, or other
deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpetual easement may be
taken over the surface ground over the deposits;
(2) an easement, when taken for any other use; and
4

(3) the right of entry upon and occupation of lands, with the right to take from
those lands earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as necessary for a public use.
Utah Code Annotated §57-18-7. Conservation easement not obtained through eminent
domain — Conservation easement may not interfere with eminent domain.
(1) No conservation easement, or right-of-way or access to a conservation
easement may be obtained through the use of eminent domain.
(2) The existence of a conservation easement may not defeat or interfere with the
otherwise proper exercise of eminent domain under Title 78, Chapter 24, Eminent
Domain.
Utah Code Annotated §72-6*113. Acquisition and improvement oflandforpreservation
of scenic beauty — Authority of department
(1) The department is authorized to acquire and improve strips of land necessary
for the restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty with and adjacent to a
federal-aid highway of this state, including acquisition of publicly owned and controlled
rest and recreation areas, sanitary, and other facilities within or adjacent to the highway
right-of-way reasonably necessary to accommodate the traveling public.
(2) Acquisition may be by gift, purchase, or exchange but may not be by
condemnation.
(3) The interest in any land authorized to be acquired and maintained under this
section may be fee simple or any lesser interest, as determined by the department to be
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes of this section.
(4)(a) Real property, or any interest in real property, acquired under this section is
part of the adjacent or nearest highway and is under the jurisdiction of the department.
(b) The department may enter into an agreement with any state agency for
maintenance of land acquired in accordance with this section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is an appealfromthe trial court'sfindingsand Order of Occupancy after denying G.
Kay, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the complaint as to the portion of land sought by UDOT for the
Legacy Nature Preserve.
B. Course of Proceedings.
UDOTfileda complaint to acquire the interest of G. Kay, Inc. in aright-of-wayeasement
5

about 25 feet wide and 2400 feet long leading to G. Kay, Inc.'s 32 acre tract for the Legacy
Parkway (highway portion) and to acquire the 32 acre tract for mitigation of impacts of the
highway which crossed about 114 acres of land proclaimed by the Corp of Engineers to be
wetlands under its jurisdiction. G. Kay., Inc.'s 32 acres and water rights were to be taken as part
of a 2100 acre Legacy Nature Preserve UDOT volunteered and/or was compelled to create for
claimed mitigation of impacts caused by construction of the highway. G. Kay., Inc. stipulated to
an order of occupancy of the easement to the extent needed for the highway (Parkway) upon
assurance of access to the 32 acre parcel. However, G. Kay, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint
as to the taking by eminent domain any part of the 32 acre tract for the Legacy Nature Preserve,
which was 1400 feet removed from the Legacy Parkway (freeway). After hearing, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss and granted the order of occupancy as to the 32 acre tract.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
UDOT by Condemnation Resolution Highway Project, Legacy Parkway 1-215 to US-89
Limited Access, commenced this action by complaint filed June 20,2001, to acquire by eminent
domain about 32 acres of G. Kay, Inc/s property and water rights for the purpose of mitigation of
impactsfrompublic transportation projects pursuant to Senate Bill 256 Transportation
Amendments (2001 General Session of the Utah Legislature). (Rl). The 32 acre tract begins
over 1400 feetfromthe Highway Project and extends some 2500 feet further removedfromthe
highway project. G. Kay, Inc/s land was included in the Legacy Nature Preserve ("Preserve")
which UDOT determined is necessary for mitigating the impact of the Highway Project
("Highway"), and is a 2,098 acre Preserve offered by UDOT to mitigate 114 acres of land which
the United States Corps of Engineers ("COE*) determined are wetlands under Section 202 of the
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Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §1344(a). G. Kay, Inc/s land was not part of the initial 1251 acres
offered for the Preserve, and was added in May 2000 before the COE would issue the *4G4
permit" to build the highway. The 404 permit authorized UDOT to placefillmaterial into 114
acres of wetlands over the 14 mile length of the Legacy Parkway ("Highway"), which is a
segment of a proposed 125 mile highway. The permit describes the 114 acres as being
jurisdictional wetlands of the United States. The permit required UDOT to acquire 2098 acres
as Mitigation Lands, and to record covenant and use restrictions which exclude all public access*
livestock, pets, mowing, spraying, hunting and vehicular access, to run with the land in
perpetuity, during which time UDOT must fund and manage the Preserve for wildlife subject to
oversight by COE under penalties for violation which include closure of the highway.
UDOT has acquired more than half of the 2098 acres by negotiation and seeks the
balance by eminent domainfromG. Kay., Inc. and other landowners whose properties lie
westerly and removedfromthe highway project A copy of the 404 permit is included with the
affidavit of Byron Parker in the Addendum hereto.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UDOT does not have any statutory authority or any other authority to acquire G. Kay,
Inc.'s 32 acre tract of land and waterrightsfor the Preserve.
The primary statute on eminent domain, Title 78, Chapter 34 in Section 1, states that the
right of eminent domain may be exercised for public buildings and grounds for the use of the
state, and all other public uses authorized by the legislature, and for "roads". The legislature
prior to Senate Bill 256 in 2001 had provided in Utah Code Annotated §72-5-103 for acquisition
erf property by condemnation "for highwayrightsof way or otter transportation purposes*, Uteh
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Code Annotated §72-5-102, "Definitions" amended by subsection (2) Senate Bill 256 in 2001 to
include as "state transportation purposes/'" the mitigationfromthe effects of construction,
reconstruction, relocation, improvement and maintenance of state highways and other
transportation facilities under control of the department," and added subsection (12), "the
mitigation of impactsfrompublic transportation projects."
The words "mitigation" and "mitigation of impacts" were not further defined and the
transcript of proceedings before the legislature (Exhibit 7) (Tr 155), does not indicate that the
legislature contemplated such mitigation by condemnation of 2098 acres of land to mitigate the
claimed loss of 114 acres of wetlands. The Senate heard Senator Knudsen, in talking a little
about examples of mitigation, include "wetland protection or replacement" in his list of about
fourteen examples of mitigation. In the House of Representatives, senator Knudsen stated that
Senate Bill 256 "was more or less of a housekeeping item" in which the Motor Transportation
Code is modified "in areas in which it scratches out highways and puts transportation purposes."
"And another thing it is doing is including mitigation in this part of their duties in things they do
to acquire rights-of-way and mostly that's it"
Senator Brandel rose in support of the bill and stated: "Now, Pm opposed to
condemnation and opposed to that process but believe this bill will solve the problem

and

this doesnt give carte blanche to do anything but it does provide a mechanism in those rare cases
where it is important, so I rise in support of this."
UDOT must have intended to acquire Preserve acreage by negotiation because no
authority for mitigation of impacts existed prior to Senate Bill 256 in the spring of 2001.
Byron M. Parker is a civil engineer who had been with UDOT fbr2I years and was
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named project director for the Legacy Parkway Project in 1997. Parker's affidavit begins on page
47 of the record and ends at page 53. However, he attached exhibits extending his affidavit to
page 157. He testified at the hearing in reference to his affidavit. From his affidavit and
testimony he swears that the Project is entirely state funded and was in planning for many years;
the Preserve was proposed by the Governor in June 1988 to ameliorate concerns over impacts of
the proposed Parkway, and was described in UDOTs application to the COE for a permit under
Section 404 which application is Exhibit 1 to his affidavit (R55). Page 71 of the record is part of
the application which states that UDOT will acquire the Legacy Nature Preserve of 1251 acres
plus 317 acres for wildlife mitigation. The application and Environmental Impact Statements
were all prior to October 3,2000, which is the date the Record of Decision of the Federal
Highway Administration was signed (R121).
Accordingly, UDOT knew it must acquire the originally proposed 1251 acres for the
Preserve by negotiation. G. Kay, Inc. land was not included in the applications list of properties
to be acquired (1179-83) and as such was not part of the initial 1251 acres nor the 317 acres
(R761) designated in the applications.
The Record of Decision (October 3,2000) states that UDOT will preserve 1567 acres to
mitigate for project impacts of which 317 acres are to buffer Farmington Bay Waterfowl
Management Area and that UDOT will obtain fee title to the off-site compensatory mitigation
"using UDOTs power of eminent domain, as reflected in provisions such as Utah Statute §72-5103" (R107). §72-5-103 now refers to acquisition of real property in fee for "state transportation
purposes" by methods including condemnation, however before the March 9,2001 Amendment
to the statutereferredto "highway purposes", and the definition of "highway purposes" in §72-59

102 Definitions made no mention of "impacts* whatsoever prior to March 9,200L
UDOT had no power of eminent domain with respect to impacts prior to March 9> 2001
(five months after the October 3,2000 Record of Decision) and even after March 9,2001 there is
no legislative intent that impacts included creation of a nature preserve. In any event, §78-342(2) Utah Code Annotated would limit the interest in land taken for a preserve to an easement,
not a fee simple.
UDOT has a further limitation of its authority to acquire strips of land for restoration,
preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty within and adjacent to a federal aid highway
including rest and recreation areas, sanitary and other facilities within or adjacent to the highway
reasonably necessary to accommodate the traveling public by §72-6-113(1); and §72-6-113(2)
states that "Acquisition may be by gift, purchase or exchange but may not be by condemnation."
G. Kay, Inc.'s land is not within or adjacent to the highway, and the intended use as a preserve
which excludes the public and domestic animals is certainly not "necessary to accommodate the
traveling public."
To interpret "impacts" under the March 9,2001 amendment to definitions in §72-5-102 to
allow condemnation for such a nature preserve would be to attempt to repeal §72-6-113 by
nebulous implication. Parker testified that he had no knowledge that the Legislature was
appropriating money specifically for the Legacy Nature Preserve (Tr85).
CORPS OF ENGINEERS JPURISDICTIQN
UDOT and the Corps of Engineers were both acting under mistake of law when
negotiating for a Section 404 permit under the federal Clean Water Act which can require
mitigation ofloss of wetlands involving navigable waters. None ofthe waters in Davis County
10

are federal jurisdictional navigable waters.
ARGUMENT
POINT L UDOT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ACQUIRE G. KAY, INC/S LAND FOR A
PRESERVE UNDER STATE TRANSPORTATION PURPOSES.
The trial court relied upon the affidavit and testimony of project manager, Byron Parker
for facts in support of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R283). Since Parker's direct
examination was largely affirming his affidavit, we refer to his affidavit, a copy of which is
attached, for facts offered in support of UDOPs complaint for condemnation, using an
abbreviation of "afff for reference to pages of his affidavit
The Legacy Parkway Project is an entirely state-funded 14 mile highway "and includes
acquisition and suitable development of approximately 2100 acres to be set aside and protected
as the State of Utah Legacy Nature Preserve, for which there is no federal funding. The Preserve
was announced by the Governor in June 1998, and was proposed by him to accommodate the
interests of the State "in protection of wetlands, wildlife habitat, and other natural resource
values." (aff 2, R47). The Preserve was originally proposed for 1298 acres and is set forth in the
Section 404 permit application and the Federal Highway Record of decision, which were
attached to the affidavit as Exhibits 1 and 2* Prior to funding by the "State Legislature in 2001,
UDOT expanded the Legacy Nature Preserve to approximately 2100 acres." The Parkway
involvesfillingof wetlands regulated under the Clean Water Act and thus "required a permit
issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under Section 404 of that Act," and final federal
approval was obtained by UDOT in January 2001. (aff 3). "The G. Kay, Inc. property was added
on to the original 1298 acre Legacy Nature Preserve in order to meet or satisfy 404 Permit
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requirements" and the property is suitable for the Preserve, We quote paragraphs 10,11, and 12
of the affidavit (aff 6):
10* The 2100 acre Legacy Nature Preserve will provide wildlife habitat,
educational and recreational opportunities, scenic vistas, and other natural resource values
for the State. It also services to satisfy wetland and other migration requirements
developed with the Federal Highway Administration and the Corps of Engineers,
incorporated in the Section 404 Permit The 2100 acre Preserve does not exist soley to
provide mitigation for impacts to wetlandsfromthe Legacy Parkway. The Preserve will
include uplands as well as wetlands to provide wildlife and other natural resource values,
1L G. Kay, Inc. owns property that is required for the Legacy Parkway Project
Approximately ,805 acres of property are within the right of way for the Legacy Parkway
(Parcel No. 146D). Approximately 32.71 acres are in the Legacy Nature Preserve. Each
of the identified alternative alignments for the Parkway, including Alignment A, require
acquisition of the .805 acres since the alignments are essentially the sameforthis segment
of the Parkway.
12. The 404 Permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers includes restrictions
which, among others, prohibit hunting on all mitigation lands. Exhibit 3 at p. 41.
The referenced Exhibit 3 at p.41 is R147 of the trial record and provides:
Wetland mitigation will also include the acquisition of approximately 1,251 acres of
land, identified in the FEIS as the Legacy Nature Preserve, and the additional 317 acres
known as the Special Wildlife Area. In addition, UDOT will acquire approximately 530
acres of land referred to as the Golf Course, Stair Step, Centerville and Thalman
properties (collectively referred to as "Mitigation Lands.*'). Total Mitigation Lands shall
be 2,098 acres.
UDOT will record a Covenant and Use Restriction (Restrictions) with the Recorder of
Deeds for all Mitigation Lands. The Restrictions to be placed on the Mitigation Lands
are follows:,..
The restrictions include, no vehicles, no hunting, no public access, and are covenants and
restrictions to run with the land without modification in perpetuity (R148). UDOT committed to
a "long-term financial package" to support monitoring,reporting,management and maintenance
of the Preserve (R149) and to fence and gate the area (R150) and to permanently guarantee all
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necessary waterrightsto maintain the hydrology to provide and maintain wetland functions
(R152) all of which is to comply with water quality and flood control federal standards (R153).
There is an apparent inconsistency in UDOTs positionfirstasserted that the Preserve was
UDOPs own plan irrespective of COE requirements, and the subsequent agreement complying
with strict demands and performance required by the COE as a condition to issuance of the
Section 404 permit under the federal Clean Water Act G. Kay, Inc.'s counsel endeavored to
clarify the state's position and the following dialogue occurred near the end of closing arguments
(Tr 165):
MR. FADEL: Well, I think, Your Honor, Fd like clarification.
THE COURT: You bet
MR. FADEL: Does the State take the position that they had authority to proceed with
this and would have proceeded notwithstanding anything that was done by the Corps of
Engineers? I think Mr. Ogilvie mentioned that but Tm not clear that that's what he
intended.
THE COURT: 111 certainly allow it if he wants to make a statement on the record with
regard to that. Fm not sure that a factualfindingin that regard is necessary for me in the
decision making process that I went through today. But do you wish to make a statement
on the record in regard to that?
MR. OGILVIE: I think it stands sufficient as it is Your Honor. We don't need to take a
position.
MR. FADEL: Would you clarify for me, do you think you had the authority and would
have proceeded without the compulsion of the Corps of Engineers to do the Legacy
Preserve?
THE COURT: Let me allow you folks to talk after because I don't think the answer to
that question, and I understood yon like to have an answer, is necessary for the decision
that I have made.
G. Kay, Inc. wanted a clarification because if it were true that the State-UDOT was
planning the Preserve beginning in 1998 and would have created the Preserve notwithstanding
federal compulsion, then it is clear that the State was not pursuing state transportation purposes,
and never depended upon eminent domain for the Preserve in that it was not until March 9,2001
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that the legislature even addressed "impacts" in general, and made no specific provision for
something of the magnitude of a 2,100 acre nature preserve excluding people and domestic
animals.
On the other hand, if in fact UDOTs application for a Section 404 permit was the reason
for the Preserve obligations, then at least two related issues arise:
(1) UDOT intended to acquire the acreage for the Preserve by negotiation as required by
statutes in existence until March 9,2001 and not by condemnation; and
(2) Was the COE exceeding it's jurisdiction in claiming authority under the Clean Water
Act which the United States Supreme Court applies only to navigable waters of the United
States,
POINTH. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT LIMITS THE
TO NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES.
None of the waters in Davis County are jurisdictional waters of the United States and
none are considered navigable waters of the United StatesUDOT called Richard Donald Gordon as an expert to testify concerning his engagement
by UDOT to do the Environmental Impact Statement and to help get Federal approvalsfromthe
COE and the Federal Highway Administration (Tr 19), He was asked:
Q Did you ever reach the water in the Great Salt Lake?
A No.
Q Did you see how far the water line of the Great Salt Lake isfromthe Farmington Bay
area?
A I guess I viewed those areas as all somewhat interconnected. From a hydrologic
standpoint, they're separated by dikes. But in my estimation, the lake is adjacent to that
area
Q Could you see any area between North Salt Lake and Kaysville where a boat could go
from the project onto the water of the Great Salt Lake?
A Fm not aware of anything other than maybe through the Jordan River area.
14

Q Did you traverse the Jordan River at all?
A Just adjacent to the area where the nature preserve is.
Q Did you observe a dam at approximately west of Woods Cross on the river?
A I know therers a diversion structure there. I never went down to that point
Q When you were there on the Jordan River, did you notice it was being navigated by
any boats?
A No,
The federal rule on test of navigability is quoted in Hanes v. State. 973 P2d 330 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1999) at page 334 as follows:
With these facts in mind, we turn now to the test of navigability. The general rule
applied byfederalcourts to determine navigability in the context of the rights of riparian
owners to riverbeds, or land under water is as follows:
Streams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded as navigable in law;
that they are navigable infeetwhen they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in
their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; and
that navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such use is or may be
had-whether by steamboats, sailing vessels orflatboats-norin an absence of occasional
difficulties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be fact, that the stream in its natural and
ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce.
In a recent case decided by the United States Supreme Court on January 9,2001, Solid
Waste Agency v. Armv Corps of Engineers* 121 S.Ct 675 (2001) the Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals which had affirmed COE jurisdiction over an abandoned sand and gravel
pit on which a consortium of state agencies desired to develop a site for nonhazardous solid
waste- The COE had denied a permit under the Clean Water Act 33 USC §1344(a) (Section
404(a) permit). We quotefromportions of the Syllabus of the opinion.
Because the operation called for filling in some of the ponds, petitioner contacted federal
respondents, including the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), to determine if a landfill
permit was required under §404(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the
Corps to issue permits allowing the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable
waters," The CWA defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States," 33
U.S.C. §1362(7), and the Corps' regulations define such waters to include intrastate
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waters, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate of foreign
commerce," 33 CFR §328.3(a)(3). In 1986, the Corps attempted to clarify its
jurisdiction, stating, in what has been dubbed the "Migratory Bird Rule," that §404(a)
extends to intrastate waters that, inter alia, provide habitat for migratory birds. 51
Fed.Reg. 41217. Asserting jurisdiction over the instant site pursuant to that Rule, the
Corps refused to issue a §404(a) permit. When petitioner challenged the Corps'
jurisdiction and the merits of the permit denial, the District Court granted respondents
summary judgment on the jurisdictional issue. The Seventh Circuit held that Congress
has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate waters and that the
Migratory Bird Rule is a reasonable interpretation of the CWA.
Held: Title 33 CFR §328.3(a)(3), as clarified and applied to petitioner's site
pursuant to the Migratory Bird Rule, exceeds the authority granted to respondents under
§404(a) of the CWA. Pp. 679-684.
(a^ In United States v. Riverside Bawiew Homes, Inc.. 474 U.S. 121,106 S.Ct
455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419, this Court held that the Corps had §404(a) jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to a navigable waterway, noting that the term "navigable" is of'limited
import" and that Congress evidenced its intent to "regulate at least some waters that
would not be deemed 'navigable' under [that term's] classical understanding." id, at 133,
106 S.Ct. 455. But that holding was based in large measure upon Congress' unequivocal
acquiescence to, and approval of, the Corps; regulations interpreting the CWA to cover
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. See i<£, at 135-139,106 S.Ct. 455. The Court
expressed no opinion on the question of the Corps; authority to regulate wetlands not
adjacent to open water, and the statute's text will not allow extension of the Corps;
jurisdiction to such wetlands here. Pp. 679-681.
(b) The Corps' original interpretation of the CWA in its 1974 regulations-which
emphasized that a water body's capability of use by the public for transportation or
commerce determines whether it is navigable-is inconsistent with that which it espouses
here, yet respondents present no persuasive evidence that the Corps mistook Congress'
intent in 1974. Respondents contend that whatever its original aim, when Congress
amended the CWA in 1977, it approved the more expansive definition of "navigable
waters" found in the Corps' 1977 regulations. Specifically, respondents submit that
Congress' failure to pass legislation that would have overturned the 1977 regulations and
the extension of the Environmental Protection Agency's jurisdiction in §404(g) to include
waters "other than" traditional "navigable waters" indicates that Congress recognized and
accepted a broad definition of "navigable waters" that includes nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters.
The grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is
not unlimited. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison- 529 U.S. 598,120 S.Ct. 1740,146
L.Ed.2d 658. Respondents' arguments, e.g., that the Migratory Bird Rule falls within
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Congress' power to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce, raise significant constitutional questions, yet there is nothing approaching a
clear statement from Congress that it intended §404(a) to reach an abandoned sand and
gravel pit such as the one at issue. Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction
over ponds and mudflats falling within the Migratory Bird Rule would also result in a
significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water
use. The Court thus reads the statute as written to avoid such significant constitutional
and federalism questions and rejects the request for administrative deference. Pp. 682684.
Even the Great Salt Lake, though not connected to any waters between the Parkway and
the Lake, is not under jurisdiction of the United States and is solely controlled by the State of
Utah subject to any federal regulatory authority that may extend to the Great Salt Lake or its
shore lands. The Supreme Court of the United States in 1975 amended its opinion in the
previous case, in the case of Utah v. United States. 403 US 9,29 L.Ed.2d 279,91 S.Ct 283, in
the later per curiam opinion, 420 US 304,43 L.Wd.2d 211,95 S.Ct 1153 (1975) stating:
We heard oral argument upon the Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master
filed by the United States, 419 US 814,42 L.Ed.2d 40,95 S.Ct 29 (1974). We overrule
the exceptions and adopt, and direct the entry of, the Decree proposed by the Special
Master except that, as agreed by the parties, paragraph No. 1 of the proposed Decree is
modified in form by revising the phrasing of the opening paragraph to read as follows:...
For the purpose of giving effect to the above, thefollowingdecree is hereby
entered.
It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that:
"1. Subject to any federal regulatory authority that may extend to the Great Salt
Lake or its shorelands, the United States of America, its departments and agencies, are
enjoined from asserting against the State of Utah any claim of right, title and interest:
(a) to any of the exposed shorelands situated between the edge of the waters of the
Great Salt Lake on June 15,1967, and the bed of the Lake on January 4,1896, when Utah
became a State, with the exception of any lands within the Bear River Migratory Bird
Refoge and the Weber Basin federal reclamation project;
None of the properties associated with the Legacy project involve the Great Salt Lake or
its shorelands. The word "shorelands* is defined in 33 USC § 426h as follows: "As used in this
17

Act [33 USCS §§ 426e-426h], the word (shores) includes all the shorelines of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, the Great Lakes, and lakes, estuaries, and bays directly
connected therewith. (Aug. 13,1946, ch 960 § 4,60 Stat. 1057; July 28,1956, ch 768, § 4,70
Stat.)" The U.S. Supreme Court stated a definition of shore in Massachusetts v. New Yoric 271
US 65,70 L.Ed. 838,46 S.Ct 357 (1926) that generally, a grant whose boundaries extend to
"shore," or along "shore," of sea, carries only to high watermark, but word is subject to
construction by terms of deed and surrounding circumstances, and may mean water's edge at low
watermark; seashore is that well-defined area lying between high and low water mark of waters
in which tide daily ebbs and flows.
POINT HI. TO ALLOW UDOT TO DEFINE IMPACTS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE
LEGACY NATURE PRESERVE IS AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The legislature did not give UDOT "Carte Blanche" to do anything it wanted to do,
however, without any statutory definitions or guidelines, UDOT has claimed authority to define
"impacts" and act on its own definition.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co..
18 Utah 2d 276,421 P.2d 504 (1966) ruled for the defendant which challenged the right to
condemn its land because the act did not delineate the limits of the territory over which it had
authority by reference to "development of the Great Salt Lake and its environs," and that there
was an unlawful delegation of legislative power in not stating limitations on the authority
granted. See. 421 P.2d at 505. Similarly in this case, UDOT claims authority over virtually all
lands in the county to mitigate wetlands.
A subsequent Utah Supreme Court case which distinguishes the Great Salt Lake
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Authority case, is Utah Dept Of Trans, v. Fuller. 603 R2d 814 (Utah 1979) where UDOT sought
to condemn six acres of Fuller which was located awayfromthe highway but was needed for a
sewage lagoon to service a 19.54 acre rest stop for 1-15 in Box Elder County. The statute §2712-96(11) (now Utah Code Annotated §72-5-102(11)), includes as a part of state highway
purposes, "the construction and maintenance of roadside rest areas adjacent to or near any
highway." The Supreme Court held that because department of health regulations required
sewage lagoons to be at least 1000 feet awayfroman inhabited area, the sewage disposal area is
authorized by necessary implication.
By contrast, there is no statutory reference to mitigation of wetlands and no factual
evidence that G. Kay, Inc.'s land is needed in part to construct a state highway project, and to
create a state preserve. Before March 9,2001, Utah Code Annotated §72-5-102 defined eleven
categories of "state highway purposes" all of which are needed for highway projects, and none of
which include acquisition of distant wetlands as being authorized by necessary implication. If G.
Kay, Inc.'s land is to be subject to condemnation by necessary implication, UDOT should allege
to which of the eleven, now twelve, purposes the wetlands attach and the specific necessity for
the inclusion by implication.
By analogy, the Land Conservation Easement Act §57-18-1 et ff. For preservation of land
in an open condition for recreation, agriculture, and wild life specifically states in §57-18-7 that
no easement,right-of-way,or access to the easement may be acquired by eminent domain.
Hence, wetlands; are not a Utah State public purpose eligible for acquisition by eminent domain.
PODSTTIV. THE LEGACY NATURE PRESERVE IS NOT A PUBLIC USE FOR WHICH
UDOT CAN ACQUIRE FEE TITLE BY EMINENT DOMAIN.
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A Legacy Nature Preserve for wildlife to the exclusion of the people (public) and
domestic animals is not a purpose for which UDOT could acquire fee title to G. Kay, Inc.'s land,
and if otherwise permissible to be acquired by UDOT, the estate taken can only be an easement
for public use. See, Utah Code Annotated §78-34-2(2).
POINT V. IT IS IMPROPER FOR UDOT TO ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE LAND TO SATISFY
ANY AGREEMENT IT HAS WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES EVEN IF THE
AGREEMENT WERE ENFORCEABLE.
There is no authority for UDOT to acquire wetlands and it is improper to attempt the
same to satisfy any agreement the state has with federal agencies, even if the latter were
enforceable.
A Colorado case, Dept. Of Hwvs. v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.. 757 P.2d 181 (Colo.
Appl. 1988) held that the state was not authorized to condemn property that was not itself
connected with highway alteration, but which was necessary to fulfill a contractual obligation to
the owner of property which was connected with the highway project. The court held:
Furthermore, even if we assume the condemnation was for a public use, private
property may not be condemned, even for a public use, in the absence of express or
necessarily implied statutory condemnation authority. In determining the scope of the
condemnation power delegated pursuant to legislative enactment, narrow construction is
the rule, and courts must resolve uncertainty against the person asserting therightto
condemn, (citations omitted).
Here, petitioner claims authority to condemn the property at issue pursuant to §
43-1-208, C.R.S. (1984 Repl.Vol. 17). This statute allows condemnation of property
desirable to alter a portion of a state highway. It does not, however, expressly or
implicitly authorize condemnation of a private way of necessity for property having no
connection with the highway alteration. Indeed, such a construction of the statute would
authorize condemnation of any parcel of property that the highway commission deemed
necessary to fulfill a contractual obligation, even though the property might be located
milesfromthe highway itself. Construed narrowly, the statute does not authorize the
condemnation sought here.
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This holding of the Court of Appeals was upheld on certiorari by the Colorado Supreme Court,
789 R2d 1088 (1990).
The Utah statutes creating the Board of Parks and Recreation empower the Board to
acquire property for parks and recreation by eminent domain in §63-11-17(7), however, §63-1117(3) provides:
(3) The Division of Parks and Recreation shall permit multiple use of state parks and
property controlled by it for purposes such as grazing,fishingand hunting, mining, and
the development and utilization of water and other natural resources.
The legislature by providing for mitigation of unspecified impacts, could not have
intended to empower UDOT to acquire nonright-of-wayland for such restrictive purposes as a
Legacy Nature Preserve.
Even the federal statute, 16 USC 3923 forbids the acquisition of wetlands which has been
constructed for the purpose of farming or ranching or resultfromconservation activities
associates with farming or ranching. For greater reason, farm or ranch should not be acquired to
turn it into a wetland where farming and ranching are excluded, since it appears to be
congressional intent to protect farming and ranchingfromcondemnation under the Migratory
Bird Conservation Act
In Bertagnoli v. Baker. 215 P.2d 626 (Utah 1950) Justice Wolfe wrote that "The principle
of law that statutes conferring therightof eminent domain must be strictly construed in favor of
the landowner was relied upon by the court" The school board was not authorized to condemn
land outside of its district by implication where the board was authorized to participate in joint
construction or operation of a school attended by children within the district and children
residing in adjoining districts, either within or without the state.
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POINT VL UDOT IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY AND POWER TO CONDEMN WATER
RIGHTS.
There is no statute or other authority which permits UDOT to acquire water rights by
eminent domain. Even the Board and Division of Parks and Recreation who are empowered to
acquire real property by eminent domain, are not empowered to acquire water rights thereby. See
Utah Code Annotated §63-11-17. While municipalities and some water districts may acquire
water rights through eminent domain, UDOT and the State itself has no such power.
UDOTs purpose of acquiring water rights is to create wetlands where dry lands exist in
the Legacy Nature Preserve, and to exclude all human activity on the preserve. This very
purpose is inimical to water laws of the state and nation. Water must be put to beneficial use.
An early Utah case. Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club. 50 Utah 76.166 P.
309 (Utah 1917) when water was more plentiful than now in 2001, ruled that appropriation of
water tofloodland for vegetation to sustain wild fowl upon public land was not a beneficial use
even when accessible to the public to hunt ducks. The opinion stated at page 80:
The vital question, then, to be determined is, can an appropriation of water be
made under the laws of this state for the irrigation of unsurveyed, unenclosed, unoccupied
public domain of the United States for the sole production of food for wild water fowl,
which, when propagated and raised, must, of necessity be as accessible to capture,
destruction, and appropriation to use, by any other person who may seefitto hunt upon
the land, as to the person who went through the form of making an appropriation. To our
minds it is utterly inconceivable that a valid appropriation of water can be made under the
laws oftiiisstate, when the beneficial use of which, after the appropriation is made, will
belong equally to every human being who seeks to enjoy it It would be little short of an
anomaly in any system ofjurisprudence that would authorize the restraining of a person
from diverting water used solely for the propagation of ducks, and then deny injunctive,
or any, relief against the same person if he should enter upon the land irrigated, shoot the
duck ad libitum, and appropriate them to his own use. If the beneficial use for which the
appropriation is made cannot, in the nature of things, belong to the appropriator, of what
validity is the appropriation? Hie very purpose and meaning ofan appropriation is to
take that which was before public property and reduce it to private ownership. The whole
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procedure under our statute, relating to an appropriation of water, is a series of steps to
that end.
If, as stated above, there is no beneficial use tofloodinglands for public duck hunting,
certainly there is no beneficial use tofloodland to create a habitat for the exclusion of mankind
and doubtful invitation for wildlife habitat Water is too precious to perpetually commit it to
non-human consumption. Justice Durham wrote this pertinent observation in Longley v.
Leucadia Financial Corp.> 9 P.3d 762 (Utah 2000):
Water rights in the State of Utah are of utmost public concern, "Water, in an arid
state like Utah, is its life-blood, measured in currency represented by survival itself, —
without . . . justification for protracted extension/5 Blake v. Lambert 590 P.2d 351,352
(Utah 1979). This court has likened "a drop of water [to] a drop of gold." Carbon Canal
Co. v. Sanpete Water Users ASS'IL 19 Utah 2d 6,9,425 P.2d 405,407 (1967).
Apartfromnot being authorized by law, it is sinful to takefrompublic use, the precious
water and relegate it to a questionable swampfromwhich human beings are banished, and
mosquitos are invited.
This Court has the opportunity under the law to restrict UDOT to transportation purposes
and to stop the waste of water and funds to an unrelated, ill advised dream preserve, thereby
reining those being carried away by that which Justice Henroid wrote in Rock Manor Trust v.
State Road Commission. 550 P.2d 295 (Utah 1976) at page 206:
[TJhis country has arrived at that point in history where there is an anachronistic paradox
where those who seek to preserve the civil rights of a class in some cases forget the rights
of victims in the same or other cases where private property rights are involved.
CONCLUSION
The Court is respectfully requested to dismiss so much of UDOTs complaint as it
pertains to acquisition ofG. Kay, Inc/s land and water rights by eminent domain for the Legacy
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Nature Preserve. This request is not limited to preserving the rights of G. Kay, Inc., but of more
importance is saving the State thefinancialburden of acquiring the Preserve and maintaining it in
perpetuity with precious water to the exclusion of the public, especially where the State is
presently and frequently short on finances and no plan has been provided for perpetual care and
maintenance of the Preserve. Perpetual care of the Preserve is believed by Parker to be included
in the $451,000,000 Continual Fund started in 1988 (Tr 83). He testified further that UDOT
would maintain the Preserve for five years and turn it over to another agency to manage from
UDOT's
"Endowment for that activity" (Tr 104) and he did not know if the Legislature knew that
perpetual care and the endowment were included in the $451 million that was budgeted. If the
$451 million budget was created in 1998, it is doubtful that any legislator would have known
about funding the Preserve in perpetuity when the preserve was not finalized as to acreage. The
Record of Decision of the Federal Highway Administration is dated October 8,2000 (R121).
The land of G. Kay, Inc. was included in May 2000, in a 317 acre package (Tr 91) added to the
1298 acres identified in the Federal Environmental Impact Statement (Tr 89).
The complaint should be dismissed as to all property rights of G. Kay, Inc. which are not
part of the Parkway Project and are included in the Legacy Nature Preserve.
DATED this 2iL &W of May, 2002.
Re^ptfiillySubim^l,^^
(jeorge K^Fadel
Attorney for G. Kay, Inc.
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Attorney General
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P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
G. KAY, INC. and DAVIS COUNTY
TREASURER,

Civil No. 010801039
Judge Glenn R. Dawson

Defendants.

On November 9, 2001, the above-entitled matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs
Motion for Immediate Occupancy and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Deny
Plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Occupancy, Edward O. Ogilvie and J. D. Reynolds, Assistant
Attorneys General, appearing for Plaintiff, Utah Department of Transportation, and George K.
Fadel, Esq., appearing for Defendant G. Kay Inc. The Court, having considered the evidence
presented at hearing, the legal memorandums and authorities submitted by the parties, and the

arguments of counsel, hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the acquisition of property for mitigation constitutes an authorized, lawful

basis for condemnation pursuant to U.C.A. §72-5-102 et. seq.
2.

That funding has been budgeted and appropriated for the acquisition of land or

properties for the Legacy Highway Project.
3.

That the Legacy Highway Project is proceeding in a timely manner in accordance

with a set schedule or timetable, and that approximately 70% or more of the required properties
for the project have already been acquired or occupied.
4.

That Defendant's property meets the selection criteria for mitigation property

required or needed by the State of Utah for the Legacy Project and Nature Preserve.
5.

That the acquisition of Defendant's property for mitigation in this matter is

requisite and reasonably necessary to an authorized state transportation purpose.
6.

That Defendant's property is needed by or about the end of the year 2001.

7.

That the Court adopts and incorporates in its findings the in-court and affidavit

testimony of Legacy Project Manager Byron Parker.
8.

That there is no evidence of bad faith, fraud, or any abuse of discretion by the

State of Utah or Utah Department of Transportation in this matter.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Davis County Civil No. 010801039
Page 2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The law governing the taking of property by the Utah Department of

Transportation for mitigation purposes in this matter constitutes a state transportation purpose in
accordance with U.C.A. § 75-5-101 et seq.
2.

Acquisition of the mitigation property sought in this action may be lawfully

occupied or acquired by the Plaintiff, Utah Department of Transportation, as necessary and
requisite to a state transportation purpose.
DATED this

/^

day of

J a.** •

, 2001.

BY THE COURT:

GLENN R DAWSdN CY*" H *« y \ ^
District Court J u ^ g e J V " " * * " ^
\
Approved as to form:

Gfeorie'K.
Fafil
;or^e K. Fa&el
Attorney for Defendant
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Edward O. Ogilvie (#2452)
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L. ShurtlefF (#4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys For Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801) 366-0353

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

ORDER OF
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY

Plaintiff,
Project No. SP-0067( 1)0
Parcel No. 146B:WFT, 146D, 146D:A

vs.
G. KAY, INC. and DAVIS COUNTY
TREASURER,
Defendant.

Civil No. 010801039
Judge Glenn R. Dawson

Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy in the above-entitled case was
heard by the Court on November 9, 2001, Edward O. Ogilvie and J. D. Reynolds, Assistant
Attorneys General appearing for Plaintiff, the Utah Department of Transportation, and George K.
Fadel, appearing for Defendant, G. Kay, Inc. The Court, having considered the evidence and
testimony presented, and for good cause appearing, hereby Orders as follows:
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Occupancy of Parcel Nos. 146B.WFT and 146:D is

granted in foil effective December 31, 2001, or as soon thereafter as the order can be signed by.
the Court;
2. All of the property interests or other rights as acquired by the Plaintiff herein, and the
property belonging to the Defendant as affected thereby are particularly set out and described in
the Complaint on file in this action, and in the condemnation resolution and amendment thereto
to be filed in this action, copies of which are hereto attached as Exhibit A;
3.

This Order of Occupancy shall not take effect until the Plaintiff has deposited with

the Court the amount of $370,308.00, which is the amount of Plaintiff s approved appraisal of
the subject property for the use and benefit of the Defendant;
4.

The Defendant may file a motion for the withdrawal of the aforesaid funds from the

Clerk of the Court, which motion shall be granted without further notice or hearing, and the
Clerk of this Court shall immediately remit said funds payable to the Defendant. The funds as
deposited do not incur interest, and in the event Defendant does not withdraw said funds, the
Defendant shall waive interest or otherwise obtain an Order of the Court providing for payment
of the funds into an interest bearing account;
5.

The withdrawal of funds from the Clerk of the Court shall be without prejudice to the

right of the Defendant to challenge the amount of just compensation to which he may be entitled
for the taking of the subject property by condemnation.
6. The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiffs Motion for Order
Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy
UDOTv.
Page 2

of Immediate Occupancy and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Deny Plaintiffs'
Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy are hereby incorporated by reference herein.
DATED this

lH day of©ecemter2001.
BY THE COURT:

<o
GLENN R. DAWSON
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:
/ /

\ 1/

..

^

fk±X

K. FADEL
Attorney for Defendant
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TRANSCRIPTION OF TAPES OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE AND HOUSE
ON SENATE BILL 256f SESSION 2001
Transcribed by George K. Fadel
PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE:
Senate Bill 256, Transportation Amendment*
Senator Knudsen:
Senate Bill 256 basically does two things: it allows for the
Department of Transportation to acquire rights of way for public
transit projects, and it also addresses the fact and gives UDOT
authority to condemn property for mitigation purposes associated
with the highway project. I might talk a little bit about examples
of mitigation—property for construction of a pedestrian overpass;
domestic animal or wild life crossings; wetland protection or
replacementf property for noise reduction; water well protection;
historic property protection; archeological and paleontological
resources protection and a combination of recreation uses such as
bikes or off-road vehiclesf parks and sidewalks.

Those are some

of the mitigation issues.
Any questions?

Questions of Senator Knudsen?

Senator Brandel: I don't have any question. I'd like to stand in
support of this bill.

Many of you know that for several years I

served on the Public Transit Authority Board and one of the
problems that we havef whether you are for or against public
transit, one of the issues is whether or not we will be able to
build these systems or whether a citizen ought to be able to hold
us hostage as a community in acquiring property. Nowf I'm opposed
to condemnation and opposed to that process but I believe that this
1

bill will solve a probJLem.

If I am not mistakenf Senator Knudsenr

when we built the Trax project there were several instances where
a city or town committed to use their eminent domain—they put it
in writing

that they would

subsequently reneged on that.

use their eminent

domain and then

And this doesn't give carte blanche

to do anything but it does provide a mechanism in those rare cases
where it is importantf so I rise in support of this.
Any other questions of Senator Knudsen?

(Knudsen):

Seeing

no further questionsf Mr. President, I move under suspension of the
rules that Senate Bill 256 be considered read for the second and
third time and be up for final passage.
doing that.

(Knudsen):

(President):

We're not

I rescind my motion and restate it.

move that Senate Bill 256 be read for the third time.

I

Roll call.

Senate Bill 256 has received 24 aye votes, no nay votes, 2 senators
absent passes to the third reading calendar.

We now go to Senate

bill 226.
Next hearing;
Senate bill 256, Transportation Amendment, Senator Knudsen.
Knudsen:
Amendment

Thank

basically

you, Mr.
does

President.

The

things.

It

two

Transportation
modifies

the

transportation code by allowing the Department of Transportation
to acquire rights of way for public transportation projects and it
clarifies that UDOT has the authority to condemn property
mitigation purposes associated with a highway project.

That is the

purpose of the bill.
Questions of Senator Knudsen on this bill?
2

for

Seeing none.

Seeing no questionsf Mr. President, I move that Senate Bill
256 be up for final passage.

Vote:

Senate Bill 256 having

received 26 aye votes, no nay votes, and three being absent, passes
and will be referred to the House. Next we will deal with Senate
Bill 226.

3

PROCEEDINGS, IN THE UTAH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON SENATE BILL 256
2001 SESSION
Transcriber:

George K. Fadel

Transportation Amendment.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker,
Amendment*

Senator Knudsen, Senator

Bush

Senate Bill 256 is a Transportation

It's more or less of a housekeeping item.

It modifies

the Motor Transportation Code to in areas in which it scratches out
highways and puts transportation purposes. In other words, instead
of saying State Highways, says State Transportation purposes to
include more things in it.

And another thing it is doing is

including mitigation in this part of their duties in things they
do to acquire rights of way and mostly that's it.

Another part

saying the property acquired for public transit projects shall be
transferred to the public district responsible for the project.
It's just more of less updating a few things that they need to have
in the statute.

So with that I am ready for a few questions.

Representative Dillary:
my name.

I'd like to make an amendment under

Amendment 2 f dated February 27.

What this does if

approved by two-thirds of the memberf it providesf an immediate
date to allow UDOT to deal with some issues right now as it relates
to mitigation.

Further discussion of the motion to amend?

Representative Bush:

I never heard of it before.

In fact I

didn't know about this bill until about five minutes ago but I
would certainly think that Representative Dillary is presenting his
as something that I would think would be fine with the sponsor of
the

bill.

Further

discussion

to the motion
4

to

amend?

The

amendment

for

summation.

further discussion.
I'll

waive

summation.

Representative Dillary's name.
amend say aye.
amended.

Representative
It

is

Dillary

Amendment

for

#2

in.

Those in favor of the motion to

Opposed say no.

Motion passes.

Further discussion of the bill as amended.

Bill will be
Senator Bushf

back to you for summation.
SenatQt Bush:

Thank.

I believe I have said enough about

this, so I ask for a favorable vote.
Thank you.

Voting is open on Senate Bill 256 as amended.
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C l e r k of D i s t r i c t C o u r t
805 S o u t h Main S t r e e t
B o u n t i f u l , U t a h 84010
Dear C l e r k of t h e

Court

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) has deposited with you the sum of $370,308.00 in the eminent domain case
#10801039 wherein G. Kay, Inc.,is the defendant.
G.Kay, Inc. is contesting the order of occupancy and
does not elect to withdraw the funds until final determination
of the right of UDOT to condemn and occupy the land.
Although G.Kay, Inc. believes that it is

entitled

to have you deposit the sum at interest for the benefit of whichever
party is entitled eventually to withdraw the same with interest,
G.Kay, Inc. herewith pays to you the sum of
which you have indicated must be paid in order to preserve the
interest for whomever is subsequently entitled to the collective
sum.

This payment is made underprotest, for reasons among others

that the defendant in eminent domain cases is entitled to just
compensation which includes interest at 8 percent per annum.
If UDOT is to be relieved of payments of interest on the amount
deposited, it should be UDOT'S obligation to request the deposit
to be at interest and to pay the costs, if any , associated
therewith.
Without waiving its rights of redress against all
concerned parties, G. Kay, Inc. makes this payment under protest
in order to preserve the interest issue.

Accordingly, it is

requested that you deposit the funds in an interest bearing
account at the highest rate available from time to time for
the benefit of the party finally detgermined to be entitled
to receive the principal and interest.

With an expression of its regard for the person of
the Clerk of the Court and with best wishes,

G.Kay, Inc.

appreciates your service.
Respectfully,

\ t^ff^^g^/GEORGE K. FADEL
Attorney for G. Kay, Inc

cc. Mr. Edward 0. Ogilvie
Assistant Attorney General

Edward O. Ogilvie (#2452)
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff (#4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys For Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0218

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT G. KAY'S
OBJECTION TO PARAGRAPH FOUR OF
PROPOSED ORDER OF IMMEDIATE
OCCUPANCY

VS.

G. KAY, INC.; and DAVIS COUNTY
TREASURER,
Defendants.

Civil No. 010801039
Judge Glenn R. Dawson

Defendant has objected to the last sentence of paragraph 4 of Plaintiff s proposed Order
of Immediate Occupancy, a copy of which is attached hereto. In context, paragraph 4, with the
objected to language in italics, reads as follows:
4. The Defendant may file a motion for the withdrawal of the aforesaid funds
from the Clerk of the Court, which motion shall be granted without further notice or
hearing, and the Clerk of this Court shall immediately remit said funds payable to the
Defendant. The funds as deposited do not incur interest, and in the event Defendant does

not withdraw said funds, the Defendant shall waive interest or otherwise obtain an order
of the Court providing for payment of the funds into an interest bearing account;
The language above is consistent with applicable law and in accordance with UCA
§ 78-34-9. Further, Defendant has provided no legal grounds or justification for its objection.
Defendant's request for substitute language is objectionable because it is the property owner who
must request that funds be deposited into an interest bearing account. The language designating
"any party" incorrectly suggests that a condemnor could do so, and could possibly be construed
to create a duty on the part of the condemnor where none exists.
With respect to the last paragraph of Defendant's Objection, Plaintiff largely concurs in
and agrees with the points raised by Defendant.
DATED this /%f/\ day of January, 2002.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

EDWARD O. OGILVIE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Response to Defendant G. Kay's
Objection to Paragraph Four of
Proposed Order of Immediate Occupancy
UDOT v. G. Kay, Inc.
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